2. Impacts on Electricity Generation and Key Fuel Markets
Reference Case Trends
Over the next 20 years the demand for electricity is projected
to grow by 1.8 percent per year, as compared with the 1990s, during which
electricity consumption grew by 2.3 percent annually. Growth in electricity
use is expected to slow as new, more efficient appliances enter the market
and industrial production continues to shift away from energy-intensive industries.
With 3.0-percent annual growth projected for the economy as a whole, the overall
electric intensity of the U.S. economymeasured as the ratio of electricity
use to gross domestic productis projected to decline by 22 percent between
2000 and 2020.
To meet the growth in demand for electricity, 357 gigawatts
of new generating capacity is projected to be needed (Figure
4). The vast majority of new plants are expected to be natural gas fired,
with lesser amounts of new coal-fired and renewable capacity. New natural
gas-fired combustion turbines and combined cycle plants are the most economical
options for most uses. They generally have lower capital costs than other
options and they are becoming increasingly efficient.
With the addition of many new natural-gas-fired plants, the
share of electricity generated from natural gas is projected to grow from
16 percent in 1999 to 34 percent in 2020 (Figure
5). Generation from coal-fired plants is also projected to grow as a small
number of new plants are added and as existing plants are used more intensively,
but the share of generation coming from coal is projected to decline
slightly. On the other hand, generation from oil and from nuclear power is
expected to decline as some older plants are retired in the later years of
the forecast. Generation from renewable plants is projected to increase, but
not enough to maintain its current share.
Although fossil fuel use is expected to grow over the next
20 years, SO2 and NOx emissions are not projected to
be higher in 2020 than they are today (Figures
6 and 7). As a result of the emission
reduction programs established in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA90)
SO2 and NOx emissions are expected to be lower in 2020
than they were in 1999. For example, the CAAA90 cap on power sector SO2
emissions is set at 8.95 million tons for the years 2010 and beyond, and that
cap is expected to become binding in the later years of the reference case
projections as power companies exhaust their supplies of banked allowances.10 For NOx, 19 States in the Midwest and Eastern regions and the District
of Columbia are projected to see significant reductions in emissions beginning
in 2004, when a summertime emissions cap takes effect. The summer season cap
begins in 2004 and is maintained throughout the rest of the projections. Total
U.S. NOx emissions are projected to increase slightly after 2004,
but not enough to offset the earlier reduction.
Hg emissions from electric power plants are projected to remain
fairly steady between 2000 and 2020hovering around 45 tons from 2005despite
the expected increase in coal use (Figure 8).
Some existing coal plants are projected to add scrubbers to reduce SO2
emissions and selective catalytic reduction (SCR) equipment to reduce NOx
emissions, and all new coal plants are projected to have scrubbers, SCRs,
and fabric filters. While these technologies are designed primarily to reduce
SO2, NOx, and particulate emissions, they also help
to reduce Hg emissions. The addition of this equipment is expected to nearly
offset the increase in Hg emissions that would be expected with increasing
coal use.
Unlike NOx, SO2, and Hg emissions, CO2
emissions (expressed in metric tons carbon equivalent throughout this report)
are projected to rise steadily over the next 20 years as the power sector
becomes increasingly dependent on fossil fuels (Figure
9). Between 1999 and 2020, the share of electricity generation from fossil
fuels is expected to increase from 69 percent to 80 percent, and CO2
emissions from electric power plants are expected to increase by 217 million
metric tons39 percentover the next 20 years. The actions projected
to be taken to reduce SO2 and NOx emissions in the reference
case in response to the CAAA90 are not expected to reduce power sector CO2
emissions, because they will not lead to significant fuel switching.
Despite the growing demand for electricity, prices are expected
to decline by 9 percent in real terms over the next 20 years (Figure
10). The phase-in of competition in many regions of the country is one
factor in the expected decline, in addition to falling coal prices and the
declining cost and increasing performance of new natural gas technologies.
Reducing
Electricity Sector NOx,
SO2, and Hg Emissions
A number of options are available to reduce power sector emissions
of NOx, SO2, and Hg. They include emission control options
such as adding combustion controls and SCR and selective noncatalytic reduction
(SNCR) equipment designed primarily to reduce NOx emissions, flue
gas desulfurization equipment (scrubbers) to reduce SO2, and activated
carbon injection (ACI) equipment to reduce Hg.11 Other options for reducing NOx, SO2, and Hg emissions
include fuel switching (either by changing fuels at existing plants or by
retiring plants and replacing them with plants that use different fuels) and
reducing consumer demand.
In the cases examined in this report all three of the options
above are expected to play a role; but by a large margin, the key strategy
projected to be used is the installation of emissions control equipment to
reduce the three emissions. As shown in Table 3, the amount of equipment projected to be added increases as the emission caps
on the three pollutants are tightened. For example, scrubbers are projected
to be added to 90 gigawatts of capacity by 2020 in the 50-Percent Reduction
case and to 151 gigawatts in the 75-Percent Reduction case. The values in
Table 3 indicate that emissions control equipment is expected to be added
to many of the existing U.S. coal-fired electric power plants, which currently
total just over 300 gigawatts of capacity. The percentage of existing coal-fired
capacity expected to have SO2 scrubbers is larger than suggested
by the values shown in Table 3, because 90 gigawatts of that capacity already
is equipped with scrubbers.
The projections are similar for NOx emission controls:
SCRs are expected to be added to 98 gigawatts of capacity in the 50-Percent
Reduction case and to 218 gigawatts in the 75-Percent Reduction case. The
investment in SCR technology increases continuously across the cases as the
required percentage reduction increases. The same is true for expected additions
of SNCRs between the 50-Percent and 65-Percent Reduction cases; but when the
required reduction is raised to 75 percent, power suppliers are projected
to shift increasingly to SCR technology because it can achieve greater NOx
reduction.
Relative to the reference case, less capacity is expected to
be retrofitted with NOx control technology in the 50-Percent Reduction
case, because the 19-State summer season NOx cap and trade program
that is scheduled to begin in 2004 in the reference case is replaced by the
national cap and trade program in each of the analysis cases. In the 50-Percent
Reduction case the annual NOx cap, 3.1 million tons (roughly equivalent
to an average annual emission rate of 0.25 pounds per million Btu of fossil
fuel consumed in 2010 and 0.18 pounds per million Btu in 2020), can be met
with less control equipment than is required to meet the seasonal cap in the
reference case. The 19-State summer season NOx emissions cap represented
in the reference is based on a target average emission rate of 0.15 pounds
per million Btu of fossil fuel consumed. The NOx emission caps
in the 65-Percent and 75-Percent Reduction cases2.2 million tons and
1.5 million tons, respectivelylead to average annual NOx
emission rates below 0.15 pounds per million Btu by 2020.
In many other aspectsincluding fuel use, generation by
fuel, and capacity additions by typethe results in the three analysis
cases are similar to those in the reference case. As the emission caps are
tightened across the cases there is a slight shift from coal-fired generation
to natural-gas-fired generation (Figures 11 and 12). For example, in the 75-Percent
Reduction case, which is projected to have the largest shift, natural-gas-fired
generation in 2020 is expected to be 10 percent above and coal-fired generation
10 percent below the reference case levels. The shifts in the two other cases
are smaller.
As the emission caps are tightened across the cases, the projected
allowance prices for NOx, SO2, and Hg are expected to
increase, particularly as the caps are lowered to the limits in the 75-Percent
Reduction case (Table 4). In this
case, the emissions controls must be added to units for which the marginal
costs per unit of reduction are higher. This is particularly true for allowance
prices for NOx and Hg. For example, the annual NOx allowance
price12 in 2020
in the 65-Percent Reduction case is projected to be $1,457 per ton, but in
the 75-Percent Reduction case it is 94 percent higher, at $2,825 per ton.
Similarly, the Hg allowance price in 2020 in the 65-Percent Reduction case
is projected to be $41,190 per pound, but in the 75-Percent Reduction case
it is more than twice as high, at $85,225 per pound.13 The requirements to reduce Hg have a significant impact on the SO2
allowance price, especially as the Hg emission caps are initially phased in.
The SO2 allowance price in the 75-Percent Reduction case in 2010
is lower than in the 65-Percent Reduction case, because efforts to meet the
tighter Hg emissions limit in the 75-Percent case also reduce SO2
emissions.
The increasing cost of allowances across the cases is driven
by several factors. For example, for a particular plant, the plant size, sulfur
content of the coal used, and plant capacity factor are important in determining
the cost of reducing SO2. Smaller plants are in general more costly
(per unit of capacity) to retrofit with scrubbers than are larger plants.
It is also more expensive on a per ton removal basis to control SO2
at a plant using relatively low-sulfur coal. Similarly, it is more expensive
on a per ton removal basis to add a scrubber to a plant that is not used intensively.
For example, for a large plant with scrubber capital costs of $200 per kilowatt,
using a 2-percent sulfur coal and operating at a 75-percent capacity factor,
the cost of removing SO2 is expected to be approximately $250 per
ton. If the plant used a 1-percent sulfur coal the cost estimate would double,
and if it operated at a 37.5-percent capacity factor the cost estimate would
double again. For a smaller plant, with scrubber capital costs that could
be $400 per kilowatt or more, the corresponding SO2 removal costs
would be even higher. As a result, when controls must be added to smaller
plants that are already using relatively low-sulfur coals and operating less
intensively, the per ton costs of removal can be quite high.14
Investments in emissions control technology, combined with
higher expenditures for natural gas, are projected to lead to higher supplier
resource costs in the three emission reduction cases (Table
5). Supplier resource costs include electricity producers
expenditures on fuel, nonfuel operations and maintenance costs, and investments
in new plants and emissions control equipment. In the 75-Percent Reduction
case, suppliers are projected to incur $89 billion (constant 1999 dollars)
more in resource costs between 2001 and 2020 than in the reference case (Figure
13). On an average annual basis, the increases in resource costs in the
three cases average $1.4 billion, $3.3 billion, and $4.4 billion, in the 50-Percent,
65-Percent, and 75-Percent Reduction cases, respectively.15
Changes in electricity prices are expected to parallel the
changes in supplier resource costs in the three analysis cases (Figure
14). In percentage terms, electricity prices in 2010 are expected to range
between 0 and 2 percent higher than in the reference case; and in 2020, as
the emission caps tighten, they are expected to range between 2 and 6 percent
higher. On an average annual basis, the projected increases in electricity
revenues (prices times sales) relative to the reference case in 2020 are
$4 billion, $9 billion, and $14 billion in the 50-Percent, 65-Percent, and
75-Percent Reduction cases, respectively.
Offsetting
CO2 Emissions Growth After 2008
Because of the slight shift from coal-fired to natural-gas-fired
generation, reducing power sector NOx, SO2, and Hg emissions
is projected to have some impact on CO2 emissions (Figure
15). In 2010, CO2 emissions in the analysis cases are projected
to be between 14 million and 33 million metric tons below the level expected
in the reference case. (The projections for CO2 emissions are lower
in the more stringent cases, because the expected shifts from coal to natural
gas are larger.) In 2020, the range is slightly wider, between 12 million
and 36 million metric tons. Even with these reductions, however, power sector
CO2 emissions in 2020 are projected to be between 262 million and
286 million metric tons (between 55 and 60 percent) above the 1990 level.
The potential exists for an increase in the use of coal and
in its associated emissions in sectors of the economy (i.e., residential,
commercial, and industrial) not covered by emission cap programs. However,
because coal plays such a small role in those sectors and the projected decreases
in coal prices are generally expected to be less than a few percent, the potential
for emission leakage appears slight.16 The increase in natural gas prices that is projected to occur because of increased
use in the electricity sector appears to be more significant, leading to lower
overall fuel consumption and lower emissions in the non-electricity sectors.
If a cap is imposed on power sector CO2 emissions
at the projected 2008 reference case level of 672 million metric tons (197
million metric tons or 41 percent above the 1990 level), power suppliers will
have to either take action to reduce their emissions or purchase offsets for
between 65 million and 89 million metric tons by 2020 (Figure
16). (Again, fewer offsets are required in the more stringent cases, because
the expected shifts from coal to natural gas as a result of the other emission
caps are larger.) Note that no offsets are required until projected CO2
emissions in each of the three analysis cases exceed the assumed CO2
cap (the 2008 level expected in the reference case), which is projected to
occur in 2010 in the 50-Percent Reduction case, in 2012 in the 65-Percent
Reduction case, and in 2013 in the 75-Percent Reduction case.
To determine the prices that U.S. power suppliers might be
willing to pay for offsets, the three analysis cases were rerun with CO2
emissions capped at the 2008 reference case level (Figure
17). The projected allowance prices in 2020 range between $33 and $54
per metric ton. As compared with earlier studies of the expected costs to
the U.S. power sector of meeting the Kyoto Protocol requirements, these allowances
prices are quite low; however, the CO2 emissions cap assumed in
this analysis (41 percent above the 1990 level) is very different from the
U.S. target specified in the Kyoto agreement (7 percent below the 1990 level).
The key CO2 compliance strategy in these cases is expected to be
a further shift from coal to natural-gas-fired generation. For example, in
the 75-Percent Reduction case with no CO2 cap, coal-fired generation
in 2020 is projected to be 10 percent below the reference case level, and
natural-gas-fired generation is projected to be 10 percent above the reference
case level. In the 75-Percent Reduction case with a CO2 cap set
to the 2008 reference case level, the impacts are approximately doubled.
Because of the reduced reliance on coal projected in the cases
with CO2 caps, the investments in NOx, SO2,
and Hg control equipment are projected to be lower. For example, scrubbers
are projected to be added to nearly 152 gigawatts of capacity in the 75-Percent
Reduction case without a CO2 cap, as compared with only 115 gigawatts
when the CO2 cap is incorporated. In the early years of the projections,
the expected investments in control equipment to reduce emissions of NOx,
SO2, and Hg in the cases with and without CO2 caps are
similar; but they are much lower in the later years, when CO2 emission
caps are imposed. The projected allowance prices for NOx and Hg
are also lower when the CO2 emissions cap is included.
The projected CO2 allowance prices in the cases
with CO2 caps represent the marginal cost of compliance within
the U.S. power sector. They also represent the maximum price that power suppliers
would be willing to pay for offsets. They would incur these costs only if
they could not purchase offsets at a lower price. The price that U.S. power
suppliers might have to pay to offset increases in CO2 emissions
above the 2008 reference case level is difficult to determine, because it
would depend on what the rest of the world did in response to any greenhouse
gas emissions reduction agreement. It would also depend on how offset programs
were defined, implemented, and verified.
The National Energy Modeling System does not represent energy
or non-energy markets outside the United States, and EIA has not made an independent
assessment of how world offset markets might evolve. Figure
18 shows world energy sector CO2 abatement supply curves (the
upward sloping curves) produced by the Pacific Northwest Laboratorys
Second Generation Model (SGM), matched against the projected requirement for
reductions if all countries complied with the Kyoto Protocol (the vertical
lines).17
The supply curves in Figure 18 represent the projected CO2
emission reductions (abatement) from reference case projections that would
occur in the energy sectors of all countries in response to rising prices
for carbon allowances. Because worldwide trading is assumed, all countriesincluding
those without greenhouse gas reduction targets in the Kyoto Protocolare
included in the supply curves, assuming full compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.
Countries with greenhouse gas reduction targets can trade with other countries
by using the Protocols clean development mechanism or joint implementation
provisions. For example, if an Annex I country made investments that led to
lower greenhouse gas emissions in China, the reductions would be counted toward
the investing countrys reduction target. The estimates include offsets
created in each countrys energy sector but exclude offsets that might
be available from non-energy activities, such as changes in agricultural practices
and reforestation activities. The reductions would be expected to come from
numerous sources, including changes in fuel use, improvements in production
efficiency (more efficient power plants), and reductions in consumer energy
use.
The demand curves represent the estimated reduction in carbon
emissions required by Annex I countries to reach full compliance with the
Kyoto Protocol. The United States is included in both the supply and demand
curves in Figure 18, assuming full U.S. compliance with the Protocol. The
intersections of the lines of the same color represent the prices at which
the market for energy sector offsets would clear in 2010, 2015, and 2020.
Both the supply of offsets and the demand for them are projected to grow over
time as a result of expected economic growth and changing technologies.
Because this study does not assume U.S. participation in the
Kyoto Protocol, adjustments were made to remove the U.S. contribution from
the demand curves in Figure 18. Without U.S. participation in the Protocol,
the demand for offsets would be much lower than depicted in Figure 18. For
example, if the rest of the world complied with the Protocol while the United
States did not, the world trading price for energy sector carbon allowances
would be fairly lowrising from just a few dollars in 2010 to roughly
$5 in 2015 and $8 in 2020 (Figure 19). The supply curves in Figure 19 are the same as those in Figure 18, but the demand
curves have been shifted to the left (lowered), because the U.S. carbon
reduction requirement has been removed. The price would rise slightly as U.S.
power suppliers entered the market to purchase the 65 to 89 million metric
tons of offsets they would need; however, assuming a price of roughly $10
per metric ton in 2020, the total cost of offsets for U.S. power suppliers
would be between $654 million and $888 million in the three analysis cases.
The net result of the these estimates is that if power suppliers
are required to purchase offsets for any CO2 emissions above the
level projected to be emitted in 2008 in the reference case, their costs in
2020 could rise by as little as $654 million or by as much as $888 million.
The range in cost estimates results from the differences in offsets required
in the three cases (between 65 million and 89 million metric tons carbon equivalent
in 2020). The prices and costs could be lower if offsets from other greenhouse
gases or carbon sinks were available. The analysis above is predicated on
the assumption that the regional abatement costs curves provided by the SGM
model are rreasonable estimates. Because we have no way to verify their reasonableness,
that assumption increases the uncertainty of the cost estimates.
Uncertainties
As with any 20-year projections, there is considerable uncertainty
about the results of this analysis. The potential role of new generating and
emissions control technologies, future fuel prices, the possibility of market
reliability problems as the emission reduction programs are phased in, the
types of emission reduction programs established, and the impact on evolving
electricity markets are especially uncertain. The evolution of new technologies
is particularly unpredictable, and Hg emissions control technologies are relatively
new and untested on a commercial scale. In addition, while a substantial amount
of data about Hg emissions from coal-fired power plants has been collected
in recent years, there still is considerable uncertainty in the measurement
of Hg emissions and the extent to which control technologies designed primarily
to remove NOx or SO2 might contribute to reducing Hg.
It is possible that new, innovative technologies could be developed that would
lower the costs of Hg removal, but it is also possible that reducing Hg substantially
at some facilities may be more difficult than is presently expected with the
limited data available. The emission caps studied in this analysis would likely
stimulate additional research and development efforts for Hg control technologies.
An earlier EIA analysis examined several sensitivity cases,
including ones with alternative emission caps, alternative technology assumptions,
and alternative fuel price assumptions. The high technology Hg
removal case suggested that if Hg control technologies improved significantly,
the total and marginal costs of reducing Hg emissions could be much lower
than shown here.18
One key uncertainty is the future price of natural gas. The
vast majority of the new electricity generating capacity projected to be added
over the next 20 yearsmore than 90 percentis expected to be natural
gas fired, producing relatively low NOx emissions and virtually
no SO2 or Hg emissions. As a result, their addition and utilization
would not create substantial upward pressure on emission allowance markets.
If, however, natural gas prices turn out to be higher than projected, new
coal-fired plants could become economically attractive, and their higher emission
rates could increase the cost of meeting the emission caps and lead to higher
electricity prices.
Because of the amount of emissions control equipment projected
to be added, careful planning would be needed in all cases to ensure that
the reliability of the electricity system would not be compromised during
the transition period. System reliability could be of particular concern during
the period when a large amount of emissions control equipment would have to
be added. In many cases plants must be taken out of service when the final
connections are made for new emissions control equipment. If extended outages
resulted, or if power suppliers did not coordinate their outages to ensure
that a large number of facilities would not be out of service at the same
time, system interruptions could create the potential for price volatility
in power markets.
There is also considerable uncertainty about the price of emission
allowances that might evolve. There are numerous policy instrumentssuch
as technical standards, taxes, free allowance cap and trade programs, auction-based
cap and trade programs, and updating output-based allowance cap and trade
programsthat could be used. The instrument chosen will affect the market
response. In addition, because the different emission allowance markets are
intertwinedactions taken to reduce one pollutant will impact the othersthe
design of each program will affect the others. Therefore, allowance prices
could be very sensitive to program design issues. For CO2 emissions,
the potential price of offsets in world markets is very uncertain. Their price
and availability will depend on the projected overall economic and energy
market conditions in numerous countries over the next 20 years. In addition,
the rules on what types of programs might be included in any trading program
have yet to be finalized. This analysis only considered offsetting carbon
emissions in world energy markets.
Finally, wholesale and retail electricity markets in the United
States currently are undergoing significant change, moving from a long period
of average cost regulated prices to a system in which power prices are set
by market forces. The exact form that each of the regional markets will take
is not known at this time. Changes in market structure as a result of the
transition to competition could affect the choice of policy instruments needed
to promote the efficient implementation of new emissions standards and the
response by consumers to them. As mentioned above, a number of policy instruments
are available. Each of the options would have different price and cost impacts.
This study assumes that wholesale generation markets will behave competitively,
and that any compliance costs that increase the operating costs of facilities
setting the market price for power will be passed on to consumers. If the
markets do not behave competitively, the cost and price changes could be different
from those projected in this analysis.
Notes
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