July 2003
The countries/regions listed in this report are: a) important from an oil and gas perspective; and b) currently (or potentially in the short- to medium-term) confronting significant economic, political, or other issues that could affect domestic or world oil and gas markets. Click on the name listed below for a brief discussion/analysis of the main concerns regarding that particular country/region's energy industry.
Information contained in this report is the best available as of July 2003 and can change.Evidence that unrest continues in Algeria was provided on July 28, 2002, with the reported killing of the leader of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Rachid Abou Tourab, along with 15 other group members. The group is suspected of attacking a bus in June, killing 13 people. Also, four Algerian police officers were killed July 10, with the GIA suspected in the attack. In late 2002, there was a flareup of protests by the country's restive Berber minority demanding greater autonomy, increased employment opportunities, and better living conditions. The unrest has centered on the Kabyle region of northeastern Algeria.
OPEC member Algeria produces around 1.8 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of oil, and has net exports of about 1.6 million bbl/d. Besides oil, Algeria is a major natural gas producer, and in 2001 exported over 2 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), mainly to Europe. Despite the country's ongoing violence and civil unrest, oil and gas exports generally have not been harmed directly. However, three foreign oil workers were murdered in 1995, and many other workers left the country. For security reasons, meetings between foreign oil companies and Sonatrach (Algeria's state oil and gas company) are generally held in Europe or North America, and oil executives rarely travel to Algiers. Algeria's hydrocarbons sector depends heavily on U.S., French, German, and Japanese technology and expertise.
The region’s existing export infrastructure sits dangerously close to ethnic conflicts in Chechnya, Georgia, and the autonomous enclave of Nagarno-Karabakh. War continues in Chechnya (since being renewed most recently in 1999) and has caused a humanitarian crisis in the region, with 100,000 Chechens reportedly displaced and in refugee camps within the republic as of June 2003. Azerbaijan’s northern “early oil” pipeline passes for 80 miles through the war-torn Russian republic of Chechnya en route to the Black Sea port of Novorosiisk and can carry up to 100,000 bbl/d. The war with Chechnya has prompted Russia's oil pipeline monopoly, Transneft, to construct a 300,000-bbl/d Chechnya bypass, which was completed in 2000. However, a segment of the line passes along the Chechen border in the southern Russian republic of Dagestan before traversing Stavropol en route Terskoye in North Ossetia. Dagestan has security concerns of its own, as fighting has occurred in the republic between Islamic militants (largely from Chechnya) and Russian forces.
The western route for "early oil" from Azerbaijan, (as well as the planned Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan pipeline) passes just north of another potential conflict zone in the breakaway Azeri region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh is a mountainous territory populated mainly by ethnic Armenians but nestled inside predominantly Muslim Azerbaijan. Its declaration of independence in 1988 sparked a six-year war that killed more than 30,000 people and drove about 1 million people, mostly Azeris, from their homes. Six years of fighting ended in a Russian-mediated cease-fire that left the enclave and some surrounding territory--about 16% of the territory of Azerbaijan--firmly under control of an unrecognized ethnic Armenian government and its militia. Since the May 1994 ceasefire, hundreds of people have been killed each year in sporadic violence and by mines that mark a no-man's-land around the 1,600-square mile mountainous region.
Another flashpoint in the Caspian/Caucasus region is Georgia's remote Pankisi Gorge region, which Chechen rebels reportedly use as a base and refuge. On August 14, 2002, Russia accused Georgia of directly assisting Chechen rebels and allowing them to use the Pankisi Gorge as a base for attacks on Russia. On August 9, Russia's defense minister said that the Pankisi Gorge had emerged as the world's second main "nest" of terrorism. The Pankisi Gorge situation, along with Russian support for Georgian rebels in the breakaway province of Abkhazia, has raised tensions between the two countries in recent months. On August 24, 2002, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer stated that the United States was "deeply concerned about credible reports that Russian military aircraft indiscriminately bombed villages in northern Georgia on August 23, 2002, resulting in the killing of civilians," and worried that the attacks could "escalate existing tension between Russia and Georgia."
Besides these ethnic conflicts, political problems also affect Caspian oil and gas production. Because the southern Caspian littoral states of Iran and Turkmenistan have been unable to reach any agreement with their neighbors on delineation of the Sea's resources, development of the Caspian’s southern offshore fields has been hindered. In July 2001, Iran issued a stern warning to Azerbaijan regarding exploration activities being carried out in the Alov-Sharg-Araz block. In an escalation of tensions, Iranian military aircraft reportedly violated Azeri air space, and the head of Iran's Revolutionary Guards pointedly reminded Azerbaijan that it used to be a province of Iran, and that it should not act in any way that would antagonize Iran. In addition to the Iran-Azerbaijan dispute, Turkmenistan claims that portions of the Azeri and Chirag fields--which Ashgabat calls Khazar and Osman, respectively--lie within its territorial waters rather than Azerbaijan's. Turkmenistan has insisted that work at the Azeri and Chirag fields, which is being carried out by the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC), be stopped. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan remain locked in a dispute over the Serdar/Kyapaz field, while Azerbaijan has objected to Iran's decision to award Royal Dutch/Shell and Lasmo a license to conduct seismic surveys in a region that Azerbaijan considers to fall in its territory. Meanwhile, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan have made bilateral arrangements amongst themselves, and are developing major projects in partnerships with foreign investors.
Both FARC and ELN (Colombia's second-largest rebel group) oppose foreign energy investment, and have attacked oil and power infrastructure. In April 2002, ELN declared that oil companies working in the country were military targets, specifically naming Occidental, Repsol-YPF, and Ecopetrol. ELN and FARC bombed the Cano Limón pipeline a record 170 times (about 14 times per month) in 2001, holding in more than 24 million barrels of crude oil, according to Ecopetrol estimates. Bombings in 2002 fell to 41, allowing for increased exports of Cano Limón crude to the U.S. Gulf Coast. Aid in the form of money and military training from the U.S. government helped decrease the number of attacks on pipeline during 2002.
In February 2002, Occidental (which ELN considers a "legitimate military target") declared "force majeure" on production at the Cano Limón field. Besides Cano Limón, there have been attacks on the Transandino and Ocensa pipelines, and also on power transmission infrastructure. The BP Cusiana/Cupiagua complex's Ocensa pipeline is by far a less frequent target for bombings. While it carries more oil than the Cano Limón pipeline, more of it is underground. The company's wells are attacked occasionally, but the pipeline has fared far better than the Cano Limón. The TransAndino is subject to more bombings than the Ocensa, but fewer than the Cano Limón.
In addition to pipeline bombings, security problems also are responsible for labor unrest. Ecopetrol strikes have followed disappearances of oil union officials. An estimated 165 union members were killed in Colombia in 2001. Right-wing paramilitary organizations have claimed responsibility for abductions of oil union (USO) members, charging those abducted with ELN affiliations. Strikes in February, March, and April 2002 protested abduction and killings of oil union workers. Recently in May 2003, rebels shot hostages, including former defense minister Gilberto Echeverri and a state governor, when the government attempted to rescue them.
On February 20, 2002, Colombian President Andres Pastrana broke off peace talks with FARC and ordered the Colombian army to reenter FARC's demilitarized area. President Pastrana took this action after FARC guerrillas had hijacked an aircraft carrying 34 people and kidnapped Senator Jorge Gechem, president of a Senate peace talks committee. On May 25, 2002, Alvaro Uribe Velez was elected the new president of Colombia. Uribe, who was sworn in on August 7, 2002, promised to try to end Colombia's conflict with two guerrilla groups, and to provide greater security for energy infrastructure so as to attract more foreign investment. Among other measures, Uribe initially declared a 90-day state of emergency and levied an emergency tax to raise $778 million toward building up the military to fight off the rebels.
Colombia’s oil production in 2002, at 591,000 bbl/d, was down about 228,000 bbl/d from its all-time high of 819,000 bbl/d reached in 1999. Production has fallen in part due to attacks against the Cano Limón pipeline, in part due to "natural decline," and in part due to a lack of needed foreign investment. Colombia exported 260,000 bbl/d of oil to the United States in 2002, down from 342,000 bbl/d in 2000 and 468,000 bbl/d in 1999. For the first 4 months of 2003, Colombia's production and oil exports to the United States fell even further, to 567,000 bbl/d and 204,000 bbl/d, respectively.
Besides affecting Colombia directly, instability there has spilled over into several neighboring countries, including Ecuador, which is a significant oil producer (around 400,000 bbl/d in 2002) as well. In particular, criminal activity, kidnappings, and threats to oil operations have increased in the border region between Ecuador and Colombia. On June 27, 2002, an Ecuadorian military outpost in Ecuador's northern Carchi province was destroyed when fighting between FARC and Colombian armed forces spilled over the border. The outpost, located just over the border, was mistakenly fired upon by Colombian military forces who believed they were firing on FARC. In early October 2002, a British oil worker was kidnapped near the village of Sardinas, 60 miles southeast of Quito. Also, in December 2002, indigenous groups in Pastaza province of the Amazon region took hostage nine oil workers from Argentina's CGC. The groups are demanding that CGC halt work in the area, specifically on Block 23.
Ecuador held national elections in October 2002, with a runoff on November 24, and elected leftist former army colonel Lucio Gutierrez as president. Among other things, Gutierrez -- Ecuador's fifth president since 1997 -- has promised to implement "war economy" measures: expanding social programs, creating jobs, redistributing wealth, ending political corruption, ending many free-market policies, and increasing the state's role in the economy. In June 2003, Petroecuador oil employees went on strike to protest plans for increased private involvement in the country's oil sector, causing a temporary reduction in flows through Ecuador's main oil export pipeline. On June 16, the pipeline reportedly resumed pumping at an estimated 200,000 barrels per day -- half of its normal capacity. Ecuador’s state oil company, Petroecuador, had declared force majeure late on June 13 owing to the strike.
Besides East Timor, Indonesia faces separatist movements in all four of the country's most resource-rich provinces (Aceh, East Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, Riau). In Aceh, the separatist movement threatens stability in an oil and gas rich province in north Sumatra, abutting the strategically important Strait of Molucca (through which more than 300 large vessels, including oil tankers, pass each day). In early June 2003, Indonesia closed off access to waters around Aceh in order to prevent weapons from reaching Aceh separatists. In May 2003, Indonesia declared martial law and dispatched 40,000 troops to Aceh.
In addition to Aceh, there also have been incidents of communal violence between Muslims and Christians in the Molucca islands. Meanwhile, communities in Irian Jaya (West Papua) and Kalimantan have demanded higher revenues from natural resources produced in their regions, and a low-level insurgency in Irian Jaya has cast doubt on plans for an LNG facility in Tangguh. In August 2002, China chose Australia's Northwest Shelf Venture over Tangguh to supply it with $13 billion worth of LNG over 25 years. In part, the decision was made due to concerns over reliability of gas supplies from Indonesia compared to Australia.
In March 2001, citing deteriorating security conditions around the Arun LNG facility (including a kidnapping incident and an accidental shooting of an ExxonMobil plane in December 2000), ExxonMobil withdrew its personnel and ceased operations at the site. The company resumed limited operations on July 19, 2001. In June 2001, ExxonMobil was sued by the International Labor Rights Fund for atrocities allegedly committed by Indonesian military forces guarding ExxonMobil facilities in that country. In early July 2003, ExxonMobil announced that it was laying off 1,200 service workers at Arun due to a need for less manpower as production declines at the aging facility, which ExxonMobil runs along with Pertamina and Japan Indonesia LNG..
Continuing points of contention between Iran and the United States include: 1) Iran's pursuit of a nuclear power capability, with the assistance of Russia; 2) Iran's opposition to the Middle East peace process; 3) US accusations of Iranian support for various terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda; 4) Iranian purchases of missiles and other military equipment from North Korea, Russia, and elsewhere; 5) the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (Public Law104-073), which authorizes the imposition of US sanctions against foreign companies investing in Iranian oil or gas projects (originally applied to investments of $40 million or more annually, automatically lowered to $20 million one year after enactment); and 6) Iran's occupation of three islands in the Persian Gulf also claimed by the United Arab Emirates. The United States has had no diplomatic ties with Iran since 1979, after Islamic militants stormed the US Embassy and held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days.
In June 2003, Iran experienced several days of significant protests and unrest directed against the country's rulers. Also in June 2003, Iran stated that it would not agree to more intrusive nuclear inspections demanded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States, and the European Union. The United States government has stated its belief that Iran is pursuing a covert nuclear weapons program.
In late June 2003, following pressure from the United States, Japan said that it would not sign a major oil deal with Iran -- on development of the gigantic Azadegan field -- unless Iran addressed international concerns over its nuclear program. On July 8, Iran said that if Japan was not interested in Azadegan, that other countries would be. However, talks reportedly are continuing between the two sides on reaching a deal.
Iran produced around 3.5 million bbl/d of oil in 2002, with net exports of around 2.2 million bbl/d. It is possible that, with sufficient investment, Iran could increase its oil production capacity significantly. Iran produced 6 million bbl/d in 1974, but has not surpassed 3.8 million bbl/d on an annual basis since the 1978/79 Iranian revolution.
Iraq
Main Concerns: On May 22, 2003, following the ouster by U.S.-led coalition
forces of Saddam Hussein's regime, the UN Security Council voted (Resolution
1483) to lift sanctions against Iraq, which had been in place since its 1990
invasion of Kuwait. The restoration of Iraqi production to pre-war levels, however,
may take some time due to a variety of problems (security, infrastructure damage,
looting, electricity shortages, etc.).
Prior to the war, during January and February 2003, Iraq was producing around 2.5 million bbl/d and exporting 2.0 million bbl/d, mainly via the country's two U.N.-authorized export routes: the Turkish port of Ceyhan; and the Persian Gulf port of Mina al-Bakr. In addition, Iraq reportedly was smuggling 200,000-400,000 bbl/d of crude oil and products via a number of routes, including Turkey, Syria, Iran, Dubai, and Jordan. For 2002 as a whole, Iraq produced around 2.0 million bbl/d of oil and exported around 1.5 million bbl/d under UN Security Council Resolution 986, which allowed for Iraqi oil sales in order to raise revenue for humanitarian purposes, war reparations, and UN operations in Iraq.
In the years preceding the war,
and in anticipation of the eventual lifting of economic sanctions, Iraq had
signed or otherwise negotiated several potentially lucrative oil and gas deals
(which will come into effect when sanctions are lifted) with companies from
Russia, France, and China, and also had invited international partners to invest
in natural gas projects worth $4.2 billion. Following the war, the status of
these agreements is now somewhat unclear.
On May 28, 2002, a law firm representing the government of Libya announced
that Libya would pay $2.7 billion to the families of those who lost their lives
in the Pan Am flight 103 bombing if US and United Nations sanctions are first
lifted. Some Libyan government officials denied that any deal has been proposed,
but the lawyers employed by the Libyan government continued to affirm that a
deal was possible. In late April 2003, Libya's foreign minister stated that
Libya "has accepted civil responsibility for the actions of its officials
in the Lockerbie affair," but the U.S. State Department responded that
"What is important is whether Libya meets the U.N. requirements and...not
what their officials might say to the press." In February 2002, a spokesman for Marathon Oil announced that the US State
Department had given his company, as well as Conoco and Amerada Hess, permission
to begin renegotiating dormant oil field contracts with Libya. The approval
was issued January 22, 2002. In September 2001, Libya's Foreign Minister had
announced that US companies would be given one year to resume oil operations
in the country before Libya decides whether their licenses should be revoked
and given to other firms. As of July 2003, however, no action had been taken
on this issue. With the suspension of UN sanctions, numerous oil and gas companies are eager
to either expand operations and/or reenter the country. A full lifting of sanctions
may occur 90 days after the United Nations certifies that Libya has met all
requirements, including renunciation of support for terrorist acts. On July
9, 1999, the UN Security Council issued a statement saying that while it "welcomed
the significant progress" which Libya had made in complying with UN demands,
that at the same time Libya would need to do more (i.e., cooperate with court
proceedings, pay compensation to families if the suspects are convicted, etc.)
before sanctions were lifted permanently. Meanwhile, on July 7, 1999, Britain
reestablished diplomatic relations with Libya.
Libya
Main Concerns: On April 5, 1999, more than 10 years after the 1988 bombing
of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland that killed 270 people, Libya, which
produces 1.5 million bbl/d of oil and exports around 1.2 million bbl/d, extradited
two men suspected in the attack. In response, the United Nations suspended economic
and other sanctions
against Libya which had been in place since April 1992. These sanctions, expanded
in November 1993, had included a freeze on Libyan funds overseas, a ban on the
sale of oil equipment for oil and gas export terminals and refineries, and restrictions
on civil aviation and the supply of arms. US sanctions, including the Iran-Libya
Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996, remain in effect (in July 2001, Congress extended
ILSA for 5 more years). ILSA extends US sanctions on Libya to cover foreign companies
that make new investments of $20 million or more over a 12-month period in Libya's
oil or gas sectors.
On March 24, 2003, Shell evacuated four oil facilities, oil pipeline pumping stations at Ogbotobo, Opukushi, Tumo and Benisede, raising the number of closed Shell facilities to 14. These actions shut in 320,000 bbl/d, or nearly one-third of Shell's Nigerian output. Shell stated that an additional 50,000 bbl/d of Nigerian Bonny Light oil production was being lost in the east Niger Delta. Chevron shut in oil production totaling 440,000 bbl/d and was forced to evacuate its workers from offshore platforms and its Escravos export terminal. TotalFinaElf shut down operations producing 7,500 bbl/d in the area. At the peak, a total of 817,500 bbl/d, or nearly 40% of Nigeria's production, was shut in. As of early July 2003, Nigeria was still producing about 250,000-300,000 bbl/d below its February 2003 output of 2.36 million bbl/d.
In late June and early July 2003, Nigeria experienced a general strike. As of July 7, the strike had not adversely affected Nigeria’s oil exports, according to reports from foreign oil companies operating in Nigeria as well as the Nigerian government. Some blue-collar workers affiliated with the NUPENG union had walked out, but the white-collar union PENGASSAN had declined to join the strike, and some essential functions had been taken over by PENGASSAN workers. Oil industry sources said, however, that oil production could begin to be affected if the strike lasted for more than another day or two. Talks between the National Labor Congress (NLC) and the Nigerian government on the underlying issue of the strike - domestic petroleum product prices - were continuing with some progress, according to press reports.
In general, the security situation in Nigeria is poor, with high rates of violent crime, including kidnapping, ethnic and religious strife. Over 10,000 Nigerians have died in communal or religious violence over the past three years. Of particular concern to non-Muslims has been the imposition of Islamic Law (Sharia) in the country's predominantly Muslim northern states. Besides unrest and political instability, Nigeria also faces serious economic problems, including wide income disparities.
Illegal fuel siphoning as a result of a thriving black market for fuel products has increased the number of oil pipeline explosions in recent years. The most serious disaster was the October 1998 Jesse fire in which over 1,000 people died. One of the latest pipeline explosions outside Warri city in July 2000 resulted in 250 deaths, and marked (at least) the fifth such explosion during the last two years. In an effort to stop vandalism, the Nigerian government has ordered satellite equipment from the United States to monitor pipeline and oil installations in the Niger Delta region. In January 2001, the Nigerian navy announced plans to clamp down on arson attacks on oil facilities following the loss of about $4 billion in oil revenues last year due to vandalism. The Federal government also has ordered the navy to sink any ship conveying crude products that cannot be accounted for. The government estimates that as much as 300,000 bbl/d of Nigerian crude is illegally bunkered (freighted) out of the country. In December 2000, Nigeria reinstated the death penalty for vandalism of pipelines and electricity infrastructure.
Nigeria is one of the world's leading oil exporters, with production of around 2.3 million bbl/d of oil during 2001, and with net oil exports of around 2.0 million bbl/d, including around 885,000 bbl/d to the United States.
As of January 2003, Sudan's estimated proven reserves of crude oil stood at 563.3 million barrels. Current crude oil production averages about 250,000 bbl/d, with exports of about 220,000 barrels per day. Output has been rising steadily since the completion of a vital pipeline in July 1999. Development of Sudan's oil resources has been highly controversial. Numerous international human rights organizations have accused the Sudanese government of financing wide-scale human rights abuses with oil revenues, including the mass displacement of civilians living near the oil fields.
The SPLA has declared that it considers oil installations a "legitimate military target," as oil development has provided the Sudanese government the financial resources to expand its war effort. In late March 2002, SPLA rebel leader John Garang stated that his group would continue to attack oil installations in the center of the country despite an agreement to protect civilians and civilian targets and in September 2002, the SPLA said that it had destroyed the main oil well on the Heglig oil field. In November 2001, southern rebels claimed to have ambushed an army convoy traveling near GNPOC facilities, and stated that such attacks would continue until "oil exploration, exploitation and development come to a halt." In August 2001, an attempt by rebels to blow up Sudan's oil export pipeline was thwarted, but rebels claimed to have killed 42 government soldiers in an attack earlier in the month, and also to have inflicted "extensive damage" to oil facilities at Heglig. The government and a representative of Talisman Energy both denied the latter claim. Rebels also claimed to have launched a successful attack on oil facilities in Bentiu in mid-October 2001, but this claim also was refuted by the government.
Sudan remains under a State of Emergency, originally declared on December 12, 1999. Despite this, security risks remain high, particularly in southern Sudan. In March 2000, Swedish company Lundin Oil was forced to suspend operations in Block 5A due to safety concerns and logistical problems associated with the construction of an access road to the site. On March 27, 2003, OMV of Austria announced that the consortium of which it is a member, along with Lundin of Sweden, Petronas of Malaysia, and Sudapet of Sudan, was renewing exploration activities in Sudan after being suspended in January 2002 due to a deteriorating security situation.
Although the general work stoppage ended on February 3, 2003 in non-oil sectors, there has been no resolution Venezuela's political, economic, and social problems. On May 29, 2003, the Venezuelan government and representatives of opposition groups signed an accord that recommends holding a referendum after August 19, 2003 as the best way of ending political crisis in the world's No. 4 oil exporter. Organization of American States Secretary General Cesar Gaviria also signed the agreement, as the organization had organized the talks leading up to the agreement.
Continued instability in Venezuela has had serious implications for the country's energy sector, its state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PdVSA), and world oil markets. Venezuela is home to the Western Hemisphere's largest oil reserves, and its economy is extremely oil-dependent, despite efforts at diversification. Oil accounts for roughly three-quarters of total exports, about half of government revenues, and about one-third of GDP. Venezuela experiences periodic labor disputes and strikes which affect oil production.
Prior to the December 2002 oil strike, Venezuela was producing around 3 million bbl/d of crude oil and lease condensates. In December 2002 and January 2003, Venezuela's production fell to 1 million bbl/d and 630,000 bbl/d, respectively, with a recovery to around 2.6 million bbl/d by April. Overall, in 2002, Venezuela produced 2.9 million bbl/d of total oil, and exported around 2.4-2.5 million bbl/d, including around 1.4 million bbl/d to the United States). In the past, Venezuela was widely considered one of OPEC's main "over-producers," but in recent years appears to have adhered more closely to its OPEC production limits.
Sources for this report include: Associated Press; CIA World Factbook; Dow Jones; Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire; Global Insight; Oil and Gas Journal; US Commerce Department, International Trade Administration -- Country Commercial Guides; New York Times; Oil Daily; Petroleum Intelligence Weekly; Reuters; Russian Petroleum Investor; US Energy Information Administration; Wall Street Journal; Washington Post; World Markets Online.
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