

## Energy Situation Analysis Report

**Last Updated: April 22, 2003**

**Next Update: April 24, 2003**

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### Latest World Oil Market Developments

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- The near-month (May) West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil futures contract on NYMEX settled at \$30.87 per barrel on Monday (4/21), 32 cents per barrel higher than last Thursday, as the market covered short positions ahead of the expiry of the May delivery contract on Tuesday (4/22). [more...](#)

### Production/Export/Infrastructure Developments

**IRAQ:** U.S. Central Command says that Iraqi's southern oilfields could be pumping at 800,000 barrels per day within 5-8 weeks, while northern oilfields could be at 800,000 barrels per day within 1-5 weeks. In a separate statement, Tom Logsdon, a member of General Jay Garner's team in Iraq, recently estimated that Iraq could be pumping 1.1 million bbl/d by June 1. Currently, the fields are shut down. The current phase of the U.N. "oil-for-food" program is set to expire on June 3.

- On Sunday (4/20) a team of U.S., U.K., and Iraqi engineers pumped crude oil through the Iraqi oil infrastructure for the first time. The engineers pumped crude oil from storage facilities in southern Iraq to a power station in Basra as part of an emergency humanitarian relief effort.
- On Monday (4/21) a U.S. general overseeing the Iraqi reconstruction teams said that the importation of fuel will be necessary to meet urgent humanitarian needs.

#### PERSIAN GULF COUNTRIES:

Oil operations in other Persian Gulf countries are normal.

**Non-GULF SUPPLY:** Production in [Nigeria](#) remains constrained due to ethnic unrest in the Niger Delta. The volume of production currently disrupted is estimated at around 300,000 barrels per day, with production at 1.9 million barrels per day (MMBD). Vote counting continued in Nigeria on Tuesday (4/22) after Nigerians went to the polls on Saturday (4/19).

- Shell reportedly still has 150,000 barrels per day shut-in.
- ChevronTexaco reportedly has 140,000 barrels per day of shut-in Nigeria production remaining, all of which is in the Forcados area of the West Niger Delta region. The company reportedly does not have plans to increase production to pre-shutdown level of 440,000 barrels per day until it is sure that that the region is safe.
- TotalFinaElf has shut down around 7,500 barrels per day of its Nigeria production, and has stated that it will only return when Presidential elections are completed and Nigeria's security situation has stabilized.
- [Venezuelan](#) production is widely believed -- by striking workers and independent analysts -- to be around 2.6 MMBD. State oil company PdVSA, on the other hand, estimates current production at over 3 MMBD, close to pre-strike output levels.

#### Latest OPEC Production Table

### Oil Supply Disruption Summary

- EIA is assuming a gross supply disruption of around 1.9 MMBD from Iraq.
  - Approximately 300,000 barrels per day of Nigerian production currently is shut in due to civil unrest.
  - The gross oil supply disruption for these countries is estimated at 2.2 MMBD. Venezuela also continues to produce at levels below its November 2002 output, prior to strikes and unrest in that country.
- [more...](#)

### Latest U.S. Petroleum Information

- U.S. commercial crude oil inventories (excluding those in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve) remained relatively flat for the week ending April 11, rising by just 0.1 million barrels, and are 52.1 million barrels less than a year ago. Motor gasoline inventories fell by 0.3 million barrels and are just below the low end of the normal range. As of April 11, total commercial petroleum inventories are 126.0 million barrels less than last year at this time.
  - The U.S. average retail price for regular gasoline fell last week for the fifth week in a row. Prices dropped by 2.1 cents per gallon as of April 21 to hit 157.4 cents per gallon, which is still 17.0 cents per gallon higher than a year ago. Over the last five weeks, the average price for regular gasoline has declined by 15.4 cents per gallon.
- [more...](#)

### Special Topics and Energy Supply Security

For background information concerning [previous oil supply disruptions](#), energy supply vulnerability, infrastructure, and more. The current featured "special topics" provides a discussion of [gasoline pricing behavior](#) and a summary of [Iraq's oil infrastructure](#).

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






### Energy Prices\*

NYMEX Futures	4/21/03	4/17/03	Change	3/12/03
WTI (\$/Bbl)	30.87	30.55	+0.32	37.83
Gasoline (C/gal)	90.98	90.66	+0.32	111.39
Heating Oil (C/gal)	80.08	77.36	+2.72	103.52
Natural Gas (\$/MMBtu)	5.71	5.71	+0.00	5.87

Spot Prices				
WTI (Cushing, OK)	30.76	30.10	+0.66	37.87
Gasoline (NYH)	83.96	84.68	-0.72	105.08
Heating Oil (NYH)	84.79	83.33	+1.46	115.45
Jet Fuel (NYH)	84.29	81.95	+2.34	112.45
Natural Gas (Henry Hub)	5.55	5.54	+0.01	5.80

\*Definitions





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
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## Latest Oil Market Developments

(updated April 22, 2003)

The near-month (May) West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil futures contract on NYMEX settled at \$30.87 per barrel on Monday (4/21), 32 cents per barrel higher than last Thursday, as the market covered short positions ahead of the expiry of the May delivery contract on Tuesday (4/22), and anxiously weighed possible OPEC moves to cut the group's oil production (see below). The NYMEX near-month WTI price has now risen for five straight business days, gaining over \$3 per barrel during that period. Despite this recent increase, crude prices remain roughly \$7 per barrel below their March 12 high point of \$37.83 per barrel.

As of 8:45 am Tuesday, the near-month WTI futures contract was at \$30.55 per barrel in overnight ACCESS trading, down \$0.32 per barrel from yesterday's closing price, as traders look for indications on what OPEC might do at its April 24 meeting. With the May futures contract expiring later today, traders may balance their positions. It is still unclear whether OPEC will cut quotas, announce that they will reduce overproduction from existing quotas, or do nothing at the meeting. This uncertainty, combined with the expiration of the May futures contract, could bring some volatility to Tuesday's trading session. June futures contract prices closed \$2.04 per barrel less than May futures contract prices yesterday.

In U.S. product markets overnight, as of 8:45 am Tuesday, the near-month gasoline futures contract was at 90.40 cents per gallon, down 0.58 cent per gallon from yesterday's closing price, while the near-month heating oil futures contract was at 78.60 cents per gallon, down 1.48 cents per gallon from yesterday's closing price. Both product prices are down in conjunction with the decrease in the WTI price.

Other issues related to **world oil markets** include:

- Preliminary statements by delegates to Thursday's OPEC meeting have led some traders to consider that a production cut may be likely. On Monday (4/21) Iran's oil minister said, "All those that have increased their output in an unusual way, they should also be the first to decrease their production." Other countries, Algeria for example, have expressed interest in returning to the March 11 production ceiling in order stabilize prices. OPEC members will meet in Vienna on Thursday (4/24) to consider output policy. At this time it is not clear if Iraq will be represented at the meeting.
- Vote counting continued in Nigeria on Tuesday (4/22) after Nigerians went to the polls on Saturday (4/19). The election for president and 36 governors has already drawn some criticism from international journalists and election observers. According to press reports, preliminary results show incumbent President Olusegun Obasanjo in the lead.
- On Monday (4/21) it was reported that Baghdad's Daura refinery had resumed operations and is processing approximately 40,000 bbl/d of crude oil, or half of its capacity. According to Iraqi officials, the facility is processing crude oil which was produced prior to the war and kept in storage. Efforts are also underway to restart other Iraqi oil refineries. The country's Basra refinery is reportedly very close to resuming operations as technicians are waiting on replacement parts to be delivered from Kuwait.
- On Monday (4/21) Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler said that the pipeline leading from Iraq's northern Kirkuk oil field to Turkey's port of Ceyhan, "will continue to work [but] it depends on the arrival of vessels. So we are conducting talks because the tanks are full. Once vessels start lifting again the pipeline will start up again." The last vessel to load Iraqi oil from storage tanks at Ceyhan departed on March 20. Tankers have been reluctant to load Iraqi oil from the port owing to uncertainty over the legal status of Iraq's exports.
- On Monday (4/21) a U.S. general overseeing the Iraqi reconstruction teams said that the importation of fuel will be necessary to meet urgent humanitarian needs. The general did not say how much fuel would be imported, or from where.
- On Monday (4/21) it was reported that Baghdad's biggest power plant has resumed generation after being shut down for two weeks. According to Janan Behnam, manager of the al-Dora power plant, 90% of the city's power could be restored in a matter of days.
- On Monday (4/21) Venezuelan Deputy Oil Minister Luis Vierma said that Caracas was prepared to slash its own production in order to do its part to reduce current overproduction.
- On Sunday (4/20) a team of U.S., U.K., and Iraqi engineers pumped crude oil through the Iraqi oil infrastructure for the first time. The engineers pumped crude oil from storage facilities in southern Iraq to a power station in Basra as part of an emergency humanitarian relief effort.
- On Sunday (4/20) Iraqi oil officials began talks to designate a new oil minister and to create a plan for resuming production. Unnamed Iraqi officials told reporters that the plan's first priority entails operating Baghdad's fuel stations and restoring electricity.
- The U.N Security Council is scheduled to meet this morning (4/22) to hear from chief weapons inspector Hans Blix for the first time since the onset of war.
- On Friday (4/18) OPEC released its monthly oil market report with data for March 2003. The report indicates that the OPEC 10 countries (excluding Iraq) produced 26.06 million barrels per day on average in March, 1.41 million barrels per day over its estimate for February production, and 1.56 million barrels per day above the cartel's production ceiling. For EIA's estimates of OPEC production, see our [Latest OPEC Production Table](#).
- Colonel Michael Morrow, adviser to U.S. forces chief General Tommy Franks at Central Command in Qatar, estimated Wednesday (4/16) that Iraqi oilfields could be producing 1.6 million barrels per day within eight weeks, about two-thirds of pre-war levels, although resuming exports depends on the creation of a political authority. This assessment for the southern oilfields is more optimistic than an original target of 12-15 weeks. Production from northern fields, little damaged in the war, was expected to reach 800,000 barrels per day in 2-6 weeks, Morrow said. Production from southern fields, where some sabotage took place, is expected to restart at 800,000 barrels per day in 6-9 weeks. In a separate statement, Tom Logsdon, a member of General Jay Garner's team in Iraq, recently estimated that Iraq could be pumping 1.1 million bbl/d by June 1.
- On Thursday (4/17) sources at the refinery said that the country may be able to lift its 5-month old force majeure on gasoline exports following the completion of repairs to Paraguana's 60,000 bbl/d flexicoker unit.
- As of April 22, 2003, the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) contained 599.5 million barrels of oil. The SPR has a maximum drawdown capability of 4.3 million bbl/d for 90 days, with oil beginning to arrive in the marketplace 15 days after a presidential decision to initiate a drawdown. The SPR drawdown rate declines to 3.2 million bbl/d from days 91-120, to 2.2 million bbl/d for days 121-150, and to 1.3 million bbl/d for days 151-180.

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## Latest Oil Supply Disruption Information

(updated April 22, 2003)

For the time being, EIA is assuming that the flow of Iraqi oil exports has been stopped, resulting in a gross Middle Eastern oil supply disruption of around 1.9 million barrels per day (bbl/d). Meanwhile, Nigeria is experiencing a gross oil supply disruption of about 300,000 barrels per day. In total, around 2.2 million bbl/d of oil production from Iraq and Nigeria is currently offline, with remaining OPEC spare production capacity estimated at 0.7-1.2 million bbl/d.

Major Gross Oil Supply Disruptions (million barrels per day)		
	3/19/03	Latest (4/17/03)
Middle East*	1.8	1.9
Nigeria	0.0	0.3
<b>TOTAL</b>	1.8	2.2

\*The Middle Eastern gross oil supply disruption is based on the loss of Iraqi exports from the UN "oil-for-food" program, which averaged 1.73 million bbl/d in February 2003, plus around 200,000 bbl/d of "illegal" oil exports through Syria and Jordan. As of March 31, Shell has restarted the 60,000-bbl/d Soroosh oil field in Iran's northern Gulf, reducing the gross oil supply disruption by that amount. Soroosh had been closed since just prior to the outbreak of war with Iraq.

World Oil Supply (million bbl/d)		
	Prior to Disruption March 2003 (Base Case)	Latest Estimate
OPEC-10 Production	25.3	27.0
Iraqi Production	2.3	N.A.
Surplus Capacity	1.5-2.0	0.7-1.2

*Note:* For a more detailed analysis of OPEC production prior to disruption, see EIA's [OPEC Fact Sheet](#). For an overview of the Iraqi oil sector, see EIA's [Iraq Country Analysis Brief](#).

Price Movements			
Daily Price Information	Week Prior (3/12)	Day #1 (3/19)	Latest (4/21)
WTI Futures Price (\$/bbl)	37.83	29.88	30.87
U.S. Weekly Price Survey	Monday Prior (3/17)	Week #1 (Monday 3/24)	Latest (Monday 4/21)
Retail Regular Gasoline (cents/gallon)	172.8	169.0	157.4

*Note:* EIA collects a national survey of regular retail gasoline prices every Monday. The current oil supply disruption is not the only factor affecting prices. For more information concerning EIA price statistics and analysis, see: [This Week in Petroleum](#).

### Oil Market Highlights

OPEC Crude Oil Production <sup>1</sup> (Thousand barrels per day)					
LAST UPDATED 4/18/03	November 2002 Production	March 2003 Production	Current Production	Current Production Capacity <sup>2</sup>	Current Surplus Capacity
Algeria	938	1,100	1,200	1,200	0
Indonesia	1,100	1,060	1,050	1,050	0
Iran	3,500	3,690	3,750	3,750	0
Kuwait <sup>4</sup>	1,940	2,400	2,450 <sup>3</sup>	2,450 <sup>3</sup>	0
Libya	1,350	1,400	1,400	1,400	0
Nigeria	2,000	1,800	1,900	1,900	0
Qatar	695	750	750	850	100
Saudi Arabia <sup>5</sup>	8,100	9,500	9,600	10,000-10,500 <sup>5</sup>	400-900 <sup>5</sup>
UAE	2,000	2,300	2,300	2,500	200
Venezuela <sup>6</sup>	2,922	2,300	2,600	2,600	0
<b>OPEC 10 Crude Oil Total</b>	<b>24,545</b>	<b>26,300</b>	<b>27,000</b>	<b>27,700-28,200<sup>5</sup></b>	<b>700-1,200<sup>5</sup></b>
Iraq	2,390	1,350	N.A.	N.A.	0
<b>OPEC Crude Oil Total</b>	<b>26,935</b>	<b>27,650</b>	<b>27,000</b>	<b>27,700-28,200<sup>5</sup></b>	<b>700-1,200<sup>5</sup></b>

NA: Not Available

<sup>1</sup> Crude oil does not include lease condensate or natural gas liquids.

<sup>2</sup> Maximum sustainable production capacity, defined as the maximum amount of production that: 1) could be brought online within a period of 30 days; and 2) sustained for at least 90 days.

<sup>3</sup> Current Kuwaiti production includes surge production in excess of maximum sustainable levels. The Kuwaiti capacity number reflects this surge production.

<sup>4</sup> Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian figures each include half of the production from the Neutral Zone between the two countries. Saudi Arabian production also includes oil produced from its offshore Abu Safa field on behalf of Bahrain.

<sup>5</sup> The amount of Saudi Arabia's spare capacity that can be brought online is shown as a range between 0.4 and 0.9 million bbl/d.

<sup>6</sup> Venezuelan capacity and production numbers exclude extra heavy crude oil used to produce Orimulsion.

Top World Oil Net Exporters, 2002*		
	Country	Net Exports (million barrels per day)
1)	Saudi Arabia	6.76
2)	Russia	5.03
3)	Norway	3.14
4)	Iran	2.30
5)	Venezuela	2.26
6)	United Arab Emirates	1.95
7)	Nigeria	1.85
8)	Kuwait	1.73
9)	Mexico	1.69
10)	Iraq	1.58
11)	Algeria	1.27
12)	Libya	1.16

\*Table includes all countries with net exports exceeding 1 million barrels per day in 2002.

During 2002, roughly half of U.S. crude oil imports came from the Western Hemisphere (18% from Canada, 16% from South America, 12% from Mexico, 1% from the Caribbean), while approximately one-fifth came from the Persian Gulf region (15% from Saudi Arabia, 4% from Iraq, 2% from Kuwait).

In general, OECD Europe depends far more heavily on the Persian Gulf and North Africa for oil imports than does the United States. Japan receives over three-quarters of its oil supplies from the Persian Gulf (mainly the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and Qatar) with the remainder coming from Indonesia, China, and other sources.

Major Sources of U.S. Net Petroleum Imports, 2002*			
(all volumes in million barrels per day)			
	Total Net Oil Imports	Net Crude Oil Imports	Net Petroleum Product Imports
Canada	1.83	1.42	0.41
Saudi Arabia	1.55	1.52	0.03
Venezuela	1.37	1.20	0.17
Mexico	1.28	1.49	-0.21
Nigeria	0.60	0.57	0.03
United Kingdom	0.47	0.41	0.06
Iraq	0.44	0.44	0.00
Norway	0.38	0.34	0.04
Angola	0.33	0.32	0.01
<b>Net Imports</b>	<b>10.38</b>	<b>9.04</b>	<b>1.34</b>

\* Table includes all countries from which the U.S. imported more than 300,000 barrels per day of total oil in 2002.

Having provided this information, it is important to stress that oil is a "fungible" (interchangeable, traded on a world market) commodity, that a disruption of oil flows anywhere will affect the price of oil everywhere, and that the specific suppliers of oil to a particular country or region are not of enormous significance, at least from an economic point of view.

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## Latest U.S. Weekly EIA Petroleum Information

(last complete update: April 16, 2003)

Click [here](#) for the latest U.S. weekly data on petroleum supply and demand.

### Petroleum Inventories

U.S. commercial crude oil inventories (excluding those in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve) remained relatively flat for the week ending April 11, rising by just 0.1 million barrels, and are 52.1 million barrels less than a year ago. Motor gasoline inventories fell by 0.3 million barrels and are just below the low end of the normal range. Distillate fuel inventories, however, decreased by 0.4 million barrels, with a decrease in high-sulfur distillate fuel of 2.5 million barrels more than compensating for an increase in low-sulfur distillate fuel of 2.1 million barrels. As of April 11, total commercial petroleum inventories are 126.0 million barrels less than last year at this time.

### Petroleum Imports

U.S. crude oil imports averaged 9.4 million barrels per day for the week ending April 11, an increase of 500,000 barrels per day from the level seen in the previous week. Crude oil imports have averaged 9.6 million barrels per day over the last four weeks, which is nearly 800,000 barrels per day more than averaged over the same period last year. Although the origins of weekly crude oil imports are preliminary and thus not published, it appears that imports from Saudi Arabia were relatively high for the third week in a row. Similarly, crude oil imports from Nigeria returned to relatively high levels last week, while crude oil imports from Venezuela over the last four weeks have averaged a little below pre-strike levels. Total motor gasoline imports (including both finished gasoline and gasoline blending components) continue to pour in, averaging about 1.0 million barrels per day last week, while distillate fuel imports continue to decline with winter now in the past, averaging nearly 200,000 barrels per day.

Preliminary monthly data on the origins of U.S. crude oil imports in February 2003 has been released and it shows that three countries each exported about 1.4 million barrels per day or more of crude oil to the United States (see table below). The top sources of U.S. crude oil imports in February 2003 were: Mexico (1.495 million barrels per day), Canada (1.405 million barrels per day), and Saudi Arabia (1.397 million barrels per day). Rounding out the top ten sources, in order, were Iraq (0.909 million barrels per day), Venezuela (0.559 million barrels per day), Nigeria (0.494 million barrels per day), United Kingdom (0.407 million barrels per day), Angola (0.251 million barrels per day), Colombia (0.240 million barrels per day), and Kuwait (0.223 million barrels per day). Imports from Venezuela were up from January's level, which was the lowest level since February 1989, but still significantly less than normal, as Venezuelan exports were severely curtailed for much of February following the general strike in that country. Imports from Iraq during February averaged the most since January 2002. Total crude oil imports averaged 8.286 million barrels per day in February, a decline of 261,000 barrels per day from January, and represents the lowest level since December 1999. The top three origins accounted for 52% of U.S. crude oil imports in February, while the top ten sources accounted for 89% of all U.S. crude oil imports.

### Refinery Inputs and Production

U.S. crude oil refinery inputs increased slightly to nearly 15.5 million barrels per day during the week ending April 11, the highest average since the week ending July 26, 2002. However, despite the slight increase, decreases were seen in refinery output of distillate fuel and motor gasoline, while jet fuel output was essentially flat compared to the previous week.

### Petroleum Demand

Total product supplied over the four-week period ending April 11 averaged 20.1 million barrels per day, or about 3.3% more than the same period last year. Over the last four weeks, motor gasoline demand is down 2.0%, while distillate fuel demand is up 3.6% compared to the same period last year. Kerosene-type jet fuel demand is 3.6% more than last year over the same four-week period.



### U.S. Retail Gasoline Prices Continue to Drop (updated April 22)

The U.S. average retail price for regular gasoline fell last week for the fifth week in a row. Prices dropped by 2.1 cents per gallon as of April 21 to hit 157.4 cents per gallon, which is still 17.0 cents per gallon higher than a year ago. Over the last five weeks, the average price for regular gasoline has declined by 15.4 cents per gallon. The decline reflects, in part, the reduction in crude oil prices recently. Prices were down throughout the nation last week, with the exception of the Midwest, where prices rose by 0.8 cent per gallon. The region with the lowest price is the Gulf Coast, where prices for regular gasoline averaged 146.0 cents per gallon, while the region with the highest price is the West Coast, where prices for regular gasoline averaged 191.2 cents per gallon on April 21. Despite falling by 6.8 cents per gallon, retail prices in California remained above \$2 per gallon for the eighth week in a row, decreasing to 200.9 cents per gallon.

Retail diesel fuel prices decreased for the sixth consecutive week, falling 1.0 cent per gallon to a national average of 152.9 cents per gallon as of April 21. Diesel fuel prices are down in conjunction with recent drops in crude oil prices and in anticipation of weaker market conditions. Retail diesel prices were down throughout the nation last week, with the exception of the Midwest, where prices rose by 0.4 cent per gallon. The region with the lowest price is the Gulf Coast, where prices for diesel averaged 143.4 cents per gallon, while the region with the highest price is the Central Atlantic, where prices averaged 168.8 cents per gallon on April 21.

## U.S. Petroleum Prices

(updated April 22, 2003)




## Crude Oil and Oil Products Price Table

Date	WTI Crude Oil		Gasoline		Heating Oil		Kerojet		Propane		EIA Weekly Retail US Average	
	Spot	Futures	Spot	Futures	Spot	Futures	Spot	Futures	Spot	Spot	Gasoline	Diesel
	Cushing		NYH		NYH		NYH		Belvue	Coway		
	\$/bbl	\$/bbl	cents per gallon		cents per gallon		c/gal		cents per gallon		cents per gallon	
3/4/2003	\$36.35	\$36.83	103.61	111.22	118.35	104.86	121.35	75.75	66.75			
3/5/2003	\$36.86	\$36.69	102.20	110.09	117.19	104.39	112.26	72.25	62.38			
3/6/2003	\$37.21	\$37.00	103.03	110.60	114.03	105.56	114.03	70.50	61.75			
3/7/2003	\$37.76	\$37.78	107.80	115.67	121.00	110.85	119.63	70.44	63.00			
3/10/2003	\$37.18	\$37.27	106.20	112.82	120.75	108.57	117.88	68.00	60.50	171.2	177.1	
3/11/2003	\$36.81	\$36.72	103.70	109.87	116.60	103.02	114.10	65.38	58.25			
3/12/2003	\$37.87	\$37.83	105.08	111.39	115.45	103.52	112.45	64.50	57.38			
3/13/2003	\$36.05	\$36.01	99.38	105.77	106.84	96.71	103.84	62.50	54.94			
3/14/2003	\$35.41	\$35.38	98.75	104.04	102.30	94.07	98.55	60.13	53.25			
3/17/2003	\$34.92	\$34.93	95.37	102.71	95.70	91.57	92.95	61.63	56.50	172.8	175.2	
3/18/2003	\$31.55	\$31.67	91.10	96.19	90.45	85.78	90.20	59.38	52.38			
3/19/2003	\$30.01	\$29.88	89.39	94.25	88.55	83.61	88.30	58.38	53.19			
3/20/2003	\$28.62	\$28.61	85.85	90.39	88.00	82.44	87.50	57.88	53.50			
3/21/2003	\$27.18	\$26.91	80.10	85.25	78.75	75.56	79.75	55.25	53.63			
3/24/2003	\$29.51	\$28.66	84.58	89.79	80.45	78.37	82.70	56.25	54.75	169.0	166.2	
3/25/2003	\$33.42	\$27.97	83.25	88.49	75.05	73.49	76.85	57.00	54.19			
3/26/2003	\$28.71	\$28.63	88.75	92.42	75.55	74.41	76.05	55.38	53.25			
3/27/2003	\$30.31	\$30.37	92.75	97.47	81.00	81.15	81.75	54.75	52.07			
3/28/2003	\$30.21	\$30.16	91.05	95.39	82.08	83.25	83.70	52.63	51.82			
3/31/2003	\$31.14	\$31.04	90.32	94.44	79.62	79.24	80.12	51.82	49.94	164.9	160.2	
4/1/2003	\$29.48	\$29.78	86.24	91.42	75.78	74.09	76.65	50.38	49.63			
4/2/2003	\$28.55	\$28.56	81.90	86.39	73.90	71.86	74.15	48.50	48.50			
4/3/2003	\$28.05	\$28.97	81.83	87.16	75.30	73.17	75.55	48.38	48.38			
4/4/2003	\$28.41	\$28.62	81.35	87.03	74.90	72.60	75.40	47.88	48.00			
4/7/2003	\$27.76	\$27.96	78.05	84.25	74.43	71.64	75.80	47.25	47.38	163.0	155.4	
4/8/2003	\$27.97	\$28.00	78.80	83.84	75.43	71.80	76.80	48.01	47.38			
4/9/2003	\$28.93	\$28.85	83.50	87.57	77.50	74.29	79.25	48.34	49.25			
4/10/2003	\$27.20	\$27.46	78.54	83.46	74.90	71.61	74.90	48.34	49.75			
4/13/2003	\$28.28	\$28.14	80.53	85.04	79.10	72.45	79.10	49.50	50.19			
4/14/2003	\$28.41	\$28.63	79.53	84.91	81.18	74.75	80.56	50.50	51.38	159.5	153.9	
4/15/2003	\$29.46	\$29.29	81.70	85.88	86.00	77.26	86.00	51.38	52.50			
4/16/2003	\$29.16	\$29.18	81.43	87.27	83.98	76.49	81.60	51.44	53.00			
4/17/2003	\$30.10	\$30.55	84.68	90.66	83.33	77.36	81.95	51.88	50.75			
4/18/2003	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA			
4/21/2003	\$30.76	\$30.87	83.96	90.98	84.79	80.08	84.29	53.25	52.50	157.4	152.9	

Source: Spot and futures closing quotes as reported by Reuters News Service, retail prices reported by EIA

## U.S. Petroleum Supply

	(Thousand Barrels per Day)		Four Weeks Ending		vs. Year Ago	
			4/11/2003	4/11/2002	Diff.	% Diff.
<b>Refinery Activity</b>						
Crude Oil Input			15,184	14,766	418	2.8%
Operable Capacity			16,800	16,786	14	0.1%
Operable Capacity Utilization (%)			91.4%	89.4%	2.0%	
<b>Production</b>						
Motor Gasoline			8,015	8,263	-248	-3.0%
Jet Fuel			1,452	1,498	-46	-3.1%
Distillate Fuel Oil			3,637	3,449	188	5.5%
<b>Imports</b>						
Crude Oil (incl. SPR)			9,585	8,825	760	8.6%
Motor Gasoline			997	810	188	23.2%
Jet Fuel			81	109	-28	-25.9%
Distillate Fuel Oil			320	232	88	38.0%
Total			12,265	11,160	1,106	9.9%
<b>Exports</b>						
Crude Oil			10	8	2	25.0%
Products			967	858	109	12.7%
Total			977	866	111	12.8%
<b>Products Supplied</b>						
Motor Gasoline			8,512	8,687	-175	-2.0%
Jet Fuel			1,660	1,596	64	4.0%
Distillate Fuel Oil			3,900	3,763	137	3.6%
Total			20,115	19,481	634	3.3%
<b>Stocks (Million Barrels)</b>						
			4/11/2003	4/11/2002	Diff.	% Diff.
Crude Oil (excl. SPR)			277.2	329.3	-52.1	-15.8%
Motor Gasoline			201.9	214.6	-12.7	-5.9%
Jet Fuel			35.3	41.2	-5.9	-14.3%
Distillate Fuel Oil			95.7	122.9	-27.2	-22.1%
Total (excl. SPR)			887.6	1,013.6	-126.0	-12.4%



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● [Key Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Information](#) (*March 24, 2003*)

A summary of the most important information related to Iraq's oil reserves, oil fields, wells, production capacity, export infrastructure, refining sector, and post-war development plans.

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## Special Topics: The War's Impact on Gasoline Prices (March 25, 2003)

As of Monday, March 24, EIA's weekly survey of retail gasoline prices showed the U.S. average price for regular grade at \$1.690 per gallon, down from \$1.728 per gallon the previous week, the highest nominal (not inflation-adjusted) national average price on record. With prices this high, and months to go before the summer driving season (traditionally the time of highest gasoline demand and prices), many people are understandably concerned about the potential impact on gasoline prices of the war in Iraq. Some also note the wide variations in crude oil and wholesale gasoline prices from week to week, or even day to day, and wonder how quickly increases (or reductions) can be expected to show up at the pump.

The effect of the war on prices for crude oil and petroleum products, including gasoline, is likely to depend mostly on how events unfold, particularly in terms of the scope and duration of any interruption to world oil supplies. The commencement of military action has to date affected oil production only in and near the combat region. For the time being, EIA is assuming that the flow of legal Iraqi oil exports has been effectively stopped. Kuwait has reportedly reduced production at certain northern oil facilities, but offset this with increases elsewhere, yielding no net change. Iran has reportedly shut in production from its offshore Soroosh field in the Persian Gulf. In total, the gross Middle Eastern oil supply disruption is estimated at 1.8 million barrels per day (MMBD). (This estimate is prior to excess production capacity being brought online by other countries). At present, promises of increased supplies from OPEC, especially Saudi Arabia, appear to be perceived by markets as sufficient to offset the temporary loss of Iraqi (and some Kuwaiti and Iranian) production, as evidenced by price movements to date. In fact, after rising nearly 50 percent since mid-November 2002, reflecting both tight global supplies and uncertainty over the possibility of war, prices fell as much as \$10 per barrel in just over a week leading up to, and including, the first few days of battle.

In addition to the war in Iraq, other events continue to have substantial impact on world oil markets. Oil exports from Venezuela, a major exporter and OPEC member, remain at reduced levels as that country continues to recover from a general strike that began in early December 2002. Though official and unofficial estimates vary, Venezuelan production continues to run as much as 600,000 barrels per day lower than pre-strike levels. More recently, civil unrest in portions of Nigeria has reduced crude oil production from that OPEC member country by about 900,000 barrels per day. Problems in both of these countries have disproportionate effects on the United States, because they are among the relatively "short-haul" Atlantic Basin crude oil sources favored by refiners on the U.S. East and Gulf Coasts.

Higher crude oil prices exert upward influence on gasoline prices in two ways: a direct pass-through to all petroleum products, because crude oil is the primary feedstock to refineries; and inflation of refinery margins, because of the secondary effects of crude oil prices on refinery economics. Increases or decreases in crude oil prices, which are dependent on global supply and demand, translate almost instantly into changes in wholesale petroleum product prices, particularly in the spot and futures markets. (Each \$1-per-barrel change in crude oil prices equates to a change in product prices of about 2.4 cents per gallon).

The other major component of gasoline price changes impacted by crude oil is refining margins, the difference between product prices and crude oil prices. When the supply/demand balance for a product is tighter than that for crude oil, refining margins are pushed higher. The balance can tighten because of rising demand, reduced production or imports, or a combination of these. This has recently been the case due to low U.S. crude oil inventories, which have begun to constrain refinery runs, in addition to reduced gasoline imports related to the Venezuelan strike. Additionally, high crude oil prices are often accompanied by "backwardation" in futures markets, where prices for commodities to be delivered in later months are lower than those for immediate delivery. Such a situation provides a disincentive for refiners to purchase and refine high-priced crude oil now, to be delivered as lower-priced products later.

The two components discussed above, crude oil prices and refining margins, add up to the spot market price of gasoline. Changes in spot prices are passed through to retail prices over a period of weeks, with about two-thirds of the impact of spot price changes arriving at the retail level within two weeks. Thus, unless counteracted by other influences more specific to gasoline, changes in crude oil prices can be expected to show up in retail gasoline prices, at the rate of about 2½ cents per gallon of gasoline for each \$1 per barrel in crude oil price, within a matter of weeks. Because this "pass-through" of price changes from crude oil to wholesale and then retail gasoline markets is relatively consistent, EIA has found that near-term retail gasoline prices can be predicted with accuracy using recent spot price data.

When will last week's \$10-per-barrel drop in crude oil prices show up at the gasoline pump? The answer lies in the lagging nature of price pass-through, and is not as simple as it may sound. Because the impact of a sudden change in spot prices is passed through to retail markets over a period of weeks, there can often be conflicting influences being passed through at the same time, especially when wholesale prices have quickly reversed direction. The current situation is a perfect case in point: gasoline spot prices had only peaked two weeks ago, so a portion of last week's sharp spot price decline, along with a lagging part of the previous increase, were both contributing to retail price movements this week. As a result, the downward movement was partially offset by the upward, yielding a net retail price decline of 3.8 cents per gallon for the week (note: this refers to the national average retail price for regular gasoline; prices can vary considerably on a regional basis because of differing logistical costs and product specifications).

Although it is impossible to predict spot market behavior over the coming weeks, it is likely that we will continue to see some conflicting influences on retail gasoline prices as the spring proceeds.

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
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**Special Topics: Key Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Information  
 (March 23, 2003)**



**Iraq's Oil Reserves, Fields, Wells**

Iraq contains 112 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the second largest in the world (behind Saudi Arabia). Iraq's true resource potential may be far greater than this, however, as the country is largely (90% or so) unexplored due to years of war and sanctions. Deep oil-bearing formations located mainly in the vast Western Desert region, for instance, could yield large additional oil resources (possibly another 100 billion barrels), but have not been explored. Iraq's oil production costs are amongst the lowest in the world, making it a highly attractive oil prospect. However, only 15 of 73 discovered fields have been developed, while few deep wells have been drilled compared to Iraq's neighbors.

Overall, only about 2,000 wells reportedly have been drilled in Iraq (of which about 1,500-1,700 are actually producing oil), compared to around 1 million wells in Texas for instance. In addition, Iraq generally has not had access to the latest, state-of-the-art oil industry technology (i.e., 3D seismic), sufficient spare parts, and investment in general throughout most of the 1990s, but has instead reportedly been utilizing questionable engineering techniques (i.e., overpumping, water injection/"flooding") and old technology to maintain production.

Iraqi oil reserves vary widely in quality, with API gravities in the 22° to 35° range. Iraq's main export crudes come from the country's two largest active fields: Rumaila and Kirkuk. The southern Rumaila field, which extends a short distance into Kuwaiti territory, has around 663 wells and produces three streams: Basra Regular; Basra Medium (normally 30° API, 2.6% sulfur); and Basra Heavy (normally 22°-24° API, 3.4% sulfur). Basrah Blend normally averages around 32° API, 1.95% sulfur, but reportedly is worse currently at around 29-30° API

and 2%+ sulfur content. As of March 23, 2003, around 9 oil wells at Rumaila reportedly were on fire, with firefighters reportedly dispatched to deal with the problem, and outside analysts describing the problem as "minor" in nature.

The northern Kirkuk field, first discovered in 1927, has around 337 wells and normally produces 35° API, 1.97% sulfur crude, although the API gravity and sulfur content both are reported to have deteriorated sharply in recent months. Kirkuk's gravity, for instance, has declined to around 32-33° API, while sulfur content has risen above 2%. Declining crude oil qualities -- and an increased "water cut" as well -- could be the result of overpumping as Iraq attempts to sell as much oil as possible. An additional export crude, known as "Fao Blend," is heavier and more sour, with a 27° API and 2.9% sulfur. As of March 23, 2003, no oil well fires or other damage had been reported at Kirkuk.

**Iraq's Pre-War Production and Export Capacity**

Oil industry experts generally assess Iraq's sustainable production capacity at no higher than about 2.8-2.9 million bbl/d, with net export potential of around 2.3-2.5 million bbl/d (including smuggled oil). In comparison, Iraq produced 3.5 million bbl/d in July 1990. Approximately 2 million bbl/d of Iraq's production capacity comes from oil fields in the southern part of the country, particularly North and South Rumaylah (1.3 million bbl/d), West Qurna (225,000 bbl/d), Az Zubair (220,000 bbl/d), Majnoon (50,000 bbl/d), Jabal Fauqi (50,000 bbl/d), Abu Ghurab (40,000 bbl/d), Buzurgan (40,000 bbl/d) and Luhais (30,000 bbl/d). Iraq's remaining oil production capacity is located in the northern and central fields of Kirkuk (720,000 bbl/d), Bai Hassan (100,000 bbl/d), Jambur (50,000 bbl/d), Khabbaz (40,000 bbl/d), Saddam (30,000 bbl/d), East Baghdad (20,000 bbl/d), and 'Ayn Zalah (10,000 bbl/d).

**Iraq's Oil Export Pipelines/Terminals**

Iraq's oil export infrastructure (pipelines, ports, pumping stations, etc.) were damaged in both the Iran-Iraq War as well as Operation Desert Storm (1991). Currently, the 600-mile, 40-inch Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline is Iraq's largest operable crude export pipeline. This Iraq-Turkey link consists has a fully-operational capacity of 1.1 million bbl/d, but reportedly can handle only around 900,000 bbl/d currently. A second, parallel, 46-inch line has an optimal capacity of 500,000 bbl/d and was designed to carry Basra Regular exports, but at last report was inoperable. Combined, the two parallel lines have an optimal capacity of 1.5-1.6 million bbl/d. According to Reuters, as of March 23, 2003, the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline was operational and still pumping oil, but storage tanks at Ceyhan were nearly full and no tankers were scheduled to load.

On August 20, 1998, Iraq and Syria (which reopened their border in June 1997 -- after a 17-year closure -- for trade and official visits) signed a memorandum of understanding for the possible reopening of the 50-year-old, rusting Banias oil pipeline from Iraq's northern Kirkuk oil fields to Syria's Mediterranean port of Banias (and Tripoli, Lebanon). As of October 2002, the pipeline reportedly was being used (see above), and there also was talk of building a new, parallel pipeline as a replacement.

In order to optimize export capabilities (i.e., to allow oil shipments to the north or south), Iraq constructed a reversible, 1.4-million bbl/d "Strategic Pipeline" in 1975. This pipeline consists of two parallel 700,000-bbl/d lines. The North-South system allows for export of northern Kirkuk crude from the Persian Gulf and for southern Rumaila crudes to be shipped through Turkey. During the Gulf War, the Strategic Pipeline was disabled after the K-3 pumping station at Haditha as well as four additional southern pumping stations were destroyed.

In the Persian Gulf, Iraq has three tanker terminals: at Mina al-Bakr; Khor al-Amaya; and Khor az-Zubair (which mainly handles dry goods and minimal oil volumes). All of these ports, as well as other oil infrastructure (tanks, pipelines, etc.) in the area, reportedly were undamaged and under the control of coalition forces within the first few days of war in late March 2003. Mina al-Bakr is Iraq's largest oil terminal, with four 400,000-bbl/d-capacity, offshore berths capable of handling very large crude carriers (VLCCs). Gulf War damage to Mina al-Bakr appears to have been repaired in large part and the terminal currently can handle up to 1.2-1.3 million bbl/d. A full return to Mina al-Bakr's nameplate capacity apparently would require extensive infrastructure repairs. Mina al-Bakr also is constrained by a shortage of storage and oil processing facilities, most of which were destroyed in the Gulf War.

Iraq's Khor al-Amaya terminal was heavily damaged during the Iran-Iraq War (and completely destroyed during Operation Desert Storm in 1991) and has been out of commission since then. As of March 2001, reports indicated that Iraq had largely completed repairing two berths at Khor al-Amaya. Upon full completion of repairs, Iraq projects Khor al-Amaya's capacity will rise to 1.2 million bbl/d, and will help prevent delays at Mina al-Bakr while repairs are conducted there.

**Post-War Oil Development Plans, Pre-War Oil Deals with International Oil Companies**

In December 2002, the Council of Foreign Relations and the Baker Institute released a report on Iraq's oil sector. Among other things, the report concluded that: 1) Iraq's oil sector infrastructure is in bad shape at the moment, being held together by "band-aids," and with a production decline rate of 100,000 bbl/d per year; 2) increasing Iraqi oil production will require "massive repairs and reconstruction...costing several billions of dollars and taking months if not years;" 3) costs of repairing existing oil export installations alone would be around \$5 billion, while restoring Iraq oil production to pre-1990 levels would cost an additional \$5 billion, plus \$3 billion per year in annual operating costs; 4) outside funds and large-scale investment by international oil companies will be needed; 5) existing oil contracts will need to be clarified and resolved in order to rebuild Iraq's oil industry, with any "prolonged legal conflicts over contracts" possibly "delay[ing] the development of important fields in Iraq;" and 6) any "sudden or prolonged shut-down" of Iraq's oil industry could result in long-term reservoir damage; 7) Iraq's oil facilities could easily be damaged during any domestic unrest or military operations (in early February 2003, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan claimed that Iraqi soldiers were mining oil wells in the north of the country in anticipation of war); and 8) given all this, a "bonanza" of oil is not expected in the near future.

According to the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), problems at Iraqi oil fields include: years of poor oil reservoir management; corrosion problems at various oil facilities; deterioration of water injection facilities; lack of spare parts, materials, equipment, etc.; damage to oil storage and pumping facilities; and more. MEES estimates that Iraq could reach production capacity of 4.2 million bbl/d within three years at a cost of \$3.5 billion, and 4.5-6.0 million bbl/d within seven years.

As of October 2002, Iraq reportedly had signed several multi-billion dollar deals with international oil companies (IOCs), mainly from China, France, and Russia. Deutsche Bank estimates \$38 billion total on new fields -- "greenfield" development -- with potential production capacity of 4.7 million bbl/d if all the deals come to fruition (which Deutsche Bank believes is highly unlikely). Iraq reportedly has become increasingly frustrated at the failure of these companies actually to begin work on the ground, and has threatened to no longer sign deals unless firms agreed to do so without delay. Iraqi upstream oil contracts generally require that companies start work immediately, but U.N. sanctions overwhelmingly have dissuaded companies from doing so. In 1992, Iraq announced plans to increase its oil production capacity to over 6.3 million bbl/d following the lifting of U.N. sanctions. This plan, which was to be accomplished in three phases over a five-year period, assumed billions of dollars worth of foreign investment. Much of the production was to come from giant fields in the south (Halfaya, Majnoon, Bin Umar, West Qurna), plus the Mishrif reservoir (Luhais, North and South Rumaila, Zubair, etc.), East Baghdad, and others.

Russia, which is owed billions of dollars by Iraq for past arms deliveries, has a strong interest in Iraqi oil development. This includes a \$3.7 billion, 23-year deal to rehabilitate Iraqi oilfields, particularly the 11-15 billion barrel West Qurna field (located west of Basra near the Rumaila field). West Qurna is believed to have production potential of 800,000-1 million bbl/d. In a surprising and somewhat puzzling development, in mid-December 2002 the Iraqi Oil Ministry announced that it was severing its contract with the Lukoil consortium on West Qurna due to "fail[ure] to comply" with contract stipulations. Specifically, the Iraqis cited Lukoil's failure to invest a required \$200 million over three years. Two other, smaller, stakes in West Qurna by Russian companies Zarubezhneft and Mashinimport reportedly were left intact. In addition, three exploration and production deals were signed between Iraq and Russian companies (Soyuzneftegaz, Stroytransgas-Oil, and Tatneft, to develop the 100,000-bbl/d Rafidain field, the Western Desert's Block 4, and the Western Desert's Block 9, respectively). Despite all this, Russia's Foreign Ministry said that it viewed the Iraqi decision on Lukoil and West Qurna "with regret." In mid-February 2003, following a month of talks between the two sides aimed at reversing Iraq's decision, the Iraqis announced that its decision to cancel the Lukoil deal was "finished and the contract has been scrapped."

In October 2001, a joint Russian-Belarus oil company, Slavneft, signed a \$52 million service contract with Iraq on the 2-billion-barrel, Suba-Luhais field in southern Iraq. Full development of Suba-Luhais could result in production of 100,000 bbl/d (35° API) at a cost of \$300 million over three years. As of March 2002, Slavneft reportedly was awaiting approval from the United Nations to drill 25 wells as Luhais.

The Saddam field contains 3 billion barrels of oil and 5 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of associated gas. Iraq is seeking foreign assistance for a second-phase Saddam development, which would raise oil production capacity to 50,000 bbl/d, as well as 300 Mmcfd of gas. In early April 2001, Russia's Zarubezhneft received U.N. approval to drill 45 wells in the Saddam field, plus Kirkuk and Bai Hassan, as part of an effort to reduce water incursion into the fields.

The largest of Iraq's oilfields slated for post-sanctions development is Majnoon, with reserves of 12-30 billion barrels of 28-35° API oil, and located 30 miles north of Basra on the Iranian border. The oil major Total reportedly has a deal with Iraq on development rights for Majnoon. Majnoon was reportedly brought onstream (under a "national effort" program begun in 1999) in May 2002 at 50,000 bbl/d, with output originally projected to reach 100,000 bbl/d by the end of 2002 (according to Oil Minister Rashid). Future development on Majnoon ultimately could lead to production of 450,000 bbl/d within two years or so at an estimated (according to Deutsche Bank) cost of \$4 billion. Eventually, Majnoon could produce significantly more oil than that, possibly well above 1 million bbl/d.

In July 2001, angered by France's perceived support for the U.S. "smart sanctions" plan, Iraq announced that it would no longer give French companies priority in awarding oil contracts, and would reconsider existing contracts as well. Iraq also announced that it was inclined to favor Russia, which has been supporting Iraq at the U.N. Security Council, on awarding rights to Majnoon and another large southern oil field, Bin Umar. As of February 2003, Russian company Zarubezhneft reportedly was negotiating a contract to develop Bin Umar. The status of TotalFinaElf, which had previously expressed interest in the field, was not clear. In February 2003, TotalFinaElf said that it was confident regarding its Majnoon contract, regardless of the Iraqi government in power.

The 2.5-5 billion-barrel Halfaya project is the final large field development in southern Iraq. Several companies (BHP, CNPC, Agip) reportedly have shown interest in Halfaya, which ultimately could yield 200,000-300,000 bbl/d in output at a possible cost of \$2 billion.

Smaller fields with under 2 billion barrels in reserves also are receiving interest from foreign oil companies. These fields include Nasiriya (Eni, Repsol), Tuba (ONGC, Sonatrach, Pertamina), Ratawi (Shell, Petronas, CanOxy), Gharaf (Mashinimport, Rosneftexport), Amara (PetroVietnam), Noor (Syria), and more. Italy's Eni and Spain's Repsol appear to be strong possibilities to develop Nasiriya

**Iraq's Refining Sector**

Iraq's refining capacity as of January 2003 was believed to be over 417,000 bbl/d, compared to a pre-Gulf War, nameplate capacity of 700,000 bbl/d. Iraq has 10 refineries and topping units. The largest are the 150,000-bbl/d Baiji North, 140,000-bbl/d (or higher) Basra, and 100,000-bbl/d Daura plants. During the Gulf War, both Baiji in northern Iraq as well as the refineries at Basra, Daura, and Nasiriyah were severely damaged. Today, a lack of light-end products, low quality gasoline, and rising pollution levels because of a lack of water treatment facilities are some problems faced by Iraq's refining sector. Post-sanction plans had included attracting hundreds of millions of dollars worth of foreign investment in order to upgrade dozens of downstream (refining, pipelines, natural gas processing) facilities. Also, Iraq had planned to build a new \$1 billion, 290,000-bbl/d "Central" refinery near Babylon.

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## Definitions

### Petroleum

**WTI** – West Texas Intermediate (for the purposes of this table, prices provided are near month futures price) Cushing OK.

**Bbl** – Barrel (42 gallons).

**C's** – cents.

### Natural Gas

**Henry Hub** – A pipeline hub on the Louisiana Gulf coast. It is the delivery point for the natural gas futures contract on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX).

### Electricity

**COB** – average price of electricity traded at the California-Oregon and Nevada-Oregon border.

**Palo Verde** - average price of electricity traded at Palo Verde and West Wing Arizona.

**Average** - average price of electricity traded at all locations.