Iraq’s inability to secure crude pipelines in the north has meant that exports are generally routed through the southern port of Basrah. According to IRMO/ITAO, crude oil exports have fallen from a post-war high of around 2.0 million bbl/d in 2004, to an average of 1.5 million bbl/d in 2006. However, there is some marginal improvement recently mainly due to the intermittent ability to export crude through a northern pipeline, and improved loading capabilities in Basrah. In June 2007, Iraq issued its first tender in almost six months to sell Kirkuk oil. Iraq’s oil exports are under the domain of the Iraqi parastatal State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO). The majority of oil exports go to refineries in Asia, including China and India.

A lack of continuous refining operations has forced the GoI to import light fuels, relying heavily on deals brokered by the USG and the MoO with neighboring countries including Turkey, Iran, Syria and Kuwait. According to SOMO, in May 2006, imports of refined products totaled nearly 160,000 bbl/d. Before the war, Iraq was a large exporter of petroleum products and crude. However, according to the IMF, imports have cost the GoI close to $2.5 billion annually since 2004. In early 2007, the GoI liberalized the fuel import market and now relies on private importers of refined products to meet local demand.

In January 2007, Turkey temporarily stopped exporting refined products to Iraq due to political disagreements over Iraqi Kurdistan and outstanding debt for earlier fuel imports. In addition, Iraq now receives imports from Syria at the Iraqi border city of Al-Hasaka, and transports the fuel in state-owned trucks to the northern part of the country. In June 2007, the GoI announced plans to import an additional estimated 15,000 bbl/d of gas oil, 17,000 bbl/d of gasoline, and 7,700 bbl/d of kerosene from Kuwait.

Iraq’s 4,350-mile network of pipelines remains a target of sabotage. According to the Institute for the Analysis of GlobalSecurity (IAGS), between April 2003 and May 2007, there were over 400 attacks on Iraqi energy infrastructure. Due to security issues, much of the pipeline infrastructure is offline.

In the north, the major international crude oil pipeline is the 1.1 million-bbl/d capacity Kirkurk-Ceyhan (Iraq-Turkey) pipeline. This pipeline and its 480,000-bbl/day sister-installation have been subject to repeated attacks and function intermittently, particularly in the Beyji-Fatha area. The KRG is reportedly considering building another pipeline that avoids unfortified areas. The inability to export oil through this pipeline has severely limited exports from the northern fields.

The 200,000 – 300,000 bbl/d Iraq-Syria-Lebanon Pipeline (ISLP) has been closed and the Iraqi portion reported unusable since 2003. The initial capacity of the pipeline was approximately 700,000 bbl/d, with potential to expand to 1.4 million bbl/d. Although discussions were held between Iraqi and Syrian government officials, no timetable has been set up to repair or reopen this line. The pipeline runs across the Western Desert, by the Akkas field. Also, the 1.65 million bbl/d Iraq Pipeline to Saudi Arabia (IPSA) has been closed since 1991. There are no plans to reopen this line.

In the south, in June 2007, it was reported that Iraq is planning to build a 500,000-bbl/d crude pipeline from Haditha to Jordan’s port of Aqaba, but the project is in the very early stages of discussion. In March 2007, it was reported that Iraq and Iran agreed to build a 200,000-bbl/d pipeline to transport crude from Basrah to Abadan in return for increased liquefied gas shipments. The project was first discussed in 2005.

The 120-mile set of eight parallel pipelines connecting north-central Baiji and Daura (Baghdad) installations are frequent targets of attack. The four Baiji feedstock pipelines from Kirkuk are also frequently out of commission. The 1.4 million-bbl/d reversible “Strategic Pipeline”, which pre-war connected the northern fields through a pumping station at Haditha, to Rumaila and the storage facilities at Fao in the south, could optimize export options, particularly for the Kurds, but is mothballed due to non-functioning pumping stations and general deterioration.

Lack of functioning pipelines in the north has meant that nearly all exports have passed through the southern ports since 2003, primarily Basrah. The Al-Basrah Oil Terminal (formerly Mina al-Bakr) has the capacity to load around 82,000 bbl/hour and support Very Large Crude Carriers. There are five smaller ports on the Persian Gulf, all functioning at less than full capacity, including the Khor Al Amaya terminal. Installation of a metering system beginning January 2007, is expected improve oil accounting.

Production from the larger northern fields is mostly shut-in due to lack of functioning pipelines. However, overland routes are used to export limited amounts of crude from small fields bordering Syria. Other exports via overland routes are limited because they require passing through territory where rule of law is lacking, and truck drivers have been targeted by insurgents. These overland routes include passage to Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan.